Perrick, Michael (2018) Formal Logic and Carnap’s Rejection of Metaphysics: A Short Reflection. Open Journal of Philosophy, 08 (05). pp. 561-564. ISSN 2163-9434
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2018.85040
Abstract
From a seemingly impartial, unprejudiced point of view, Carnap claims to be able to eliminate, once and for all, all of metaphysics by “logical analysis”. We argue, on the one hand, that as far as Carnap’s analysis is strictly logical it leaves metaphysics untouched. On the other hand, we argue that as far as his analysis is epistemological it directly hits metaphysics, but lacks the prerogatives of formal logic, especially formal logic’s impartiality.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | Science Global Plos > Social Sciences and Humanities |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email support@science.globalplos.com |
Date Deposited: | 24 Feb 2023 09:41 |
Last Modified: | 15 Feb 2024 04:19 |
URI: | http://ebooks.manu2sent.com/id/eprint/236 |